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Confidence judgments are a central example of
metacognition—knowledge about one’s own cogni-
tive processes. According to this metacognitive
view, confidence reports are generated by a sec-
ond-order monitoring process based on the quality
of internal representations about beliefs. Although
neural correlates of decision confidence have been
recently identified in humans and other animals, it
is not well understood whether there are brain areas
specifically important for confidence monitoring. To
address this issue, we designed a postdecision
temporal wagering task in which rats expressed
choice confidence by the amount of time they were
willing to wait for reward. We found that orbitofrontal
cortex inactivation disrupts waiting-based confi-
dence reports without affecting decision accuracy.
Furthermore, we show that a normative model can
quantitatively account for waiting times based on
the computation of decision confidence. These re-
sults establish an anatomical locus for a metacogni-
tive report, confidence judgment, distinct from the
processes required for perceptual decisions.
INTRODUCTION
If you are asked to report your confidence in a decision—how
certain you are that you made the correct choice—you can
readily answer. What is the neural basis for this ability? Early
behavioral studies considered confidence judgments as a
type of metacognitive process related to self-awareness.
These studies established that several species besides hu-
mans are capable of confidence judgments but that some,
such as rats, may not be (Flavell, 1979; Hampton, 2001; Smith
et al., 2003; Metcalfe, 2008). Against this backdrop of behav-
ioral results, a recent line of studies identified single neuron
correlates of decision confidence across species, in the
brains of rats and monkeys (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009; Middlebrooks and Sommer, 2012; Komura190 Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.et al., 2013), as well as functional correlates in humans (Lau
and Passingham, 2006; Fleming et al., 2010; Rolls et al.,
2010a, 2010b; Yokoyama et al., 2010; De Martino et al.,
2013). However, it is still not well understood where and
how choice confidence is computed or how it is made acces-
sible to an overt behavioral report. These issues are particu-
larly interesting because they relate to the definition of meta-
cognition and awareness.
A mechanistic interpretation of metacognitive theories im-
plies that a second-order brain circuit reads first-order repre-
sentations of a separate circuit and transforms them into a sec-
ond-order representation, such as a decision variable for
confidence (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Insa-
bato et al., 2010; Middlebrooks and Sommer, 2012; Komura
et al., 2013). The representation of decision confidence in
specific brain regions implies that lesions of such brain areas
might affect the behavioral manifestation of decision confi-
dence without changing other aspects of the choice behavior.
In contrast, theoretical studies suggest that because confi-
dence estimation is central to statistical inference, it ought to
play a fundamental role in probabilistic or Bayesian neural com-
putations of all kinds (Zemel et al., 1998; Ma et al., 2006; Mor-
eno-Bote, 2010; Rao, 2010). This view suggests that the
computations of choice and confidence are mixed within the
same neural circuits and hence representations of confidence
might not be explicit or anatomically segregated (Higham,
2007). Consistent with these ideas, data from primates show
that neurons in parietal cortex that represent a perceptual deci-
sion also encode the confidence associated with that decision
(Kiani and Shadlen, 2009).
Here we pursued the hypothesis that orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) is causally required for confidence reporting independent
of perceptual decision making. This hypothesis was based on
two lines of evidence. First, previously we found that rat OFC
contains an explicit representation of decision confidence (Ke-
pecs et al., 2008). Second, OFC has been implicated in goal-
directed or intentional decisions that require the evaluation of
predicted outcomes (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Wallis,
2007; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008; Schoenbaum et al., 2009;
Kennerley et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2011; Jones et al.,
2012). Because reporting confidence requires performing an ac-
tion based on a predicted outcome, an intact OFC may be
required for adaptive adjustment of the behavior according to
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Figure 1. Postdecision Wagering Task Using
Temporal Wagers
(A) Schematic of the behavioral paradigm. To start a
trial, rats entered the central odor port and after a
pseudorandom delay of 0.2–0.5 s, a mixture of
odors was delivered. Rats responded by moving to
the left or right choice port, where a drop of water
was delivered after a 0.5–8 s waiting period for
correct decision (exponentially distributed with a
decay constant of 1.5 after a 0.5 s offset and 8 s
maximum). In a small fraction of correct choice tri-
als, water rewards were omitted. Trials of different
odor-mixture ratios were randomly interleaved in-
dependent of rats’ performance in the previous tri-
als. While waiting for reward, animals were required
to keep their snouts inside the choice port, which
was continuously monitored using infrared photo-
beams. Failure to break the photo-beam resulted in
error.
(B) Behavioral performance and psychometric
function of an example rat. Each thin line represents
logistic fit (see Experimental Procedures) to the
behavioral data collected in a single test session.
Dots represent behavioral performance averaged
across all trials of all test sessions. Thick gray
line represents logistic fit to the average perfor-
mance data shown with black dots. Error bars
represent ±SEM across trials.
(C) Odor sampling duration (the duration animals
were sampling the odor beforemoving to the choice
port) as a function of odor mixture contrast in an
example rat. Thin lines represent odor sampling
duration in each of test sessions. Thick line repre-
sents the data averaged across all trials of all test
sessions.
(D) The timing of reward delivery (blue, see Experimental Procedures) and the distribution of waiting times at the reward ports of all test sessions for one example
rat (black). Waiting times were measured for all the error trials and fraction of correct trials (i.e., reward omission trials).
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Decision Confidence and Orbitofrontal Cortexdecision confidence. At the same time, OFC is probably not
involved in most perceptual decisions.
Studying confidence reports in animals requires a clear
behavioral readout of confidence. Gambling on the outcome
of a decision generates an observable wager that can quanti-
tatively index confidence (Persaud et al., 2007; Middlebrooks
and Sommer, 2012). Appropriate wagering requires an evalua-
tion of decision confidence that can be distinguished from
random betting using a computational approach (Kepecs
et al., 2008; Fleming and Dolan, 2010; Fleming et al., 2010;
De Martino et al., 2013; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012). Therefore
to evaluate whether OFC is required for confidence reports of
perceptual decisions, we designed a gambling task for rats
with continuous wagers based on their willingness to wait for
delayed reward, interpreted the wagers within a theoretical
framework for statistical confidence, and used inactivation
methods to probe the role of OFC in waiting-based confidence
judgments.
RESULTS
A Postdecision Wagering Task
To study confidence in perceptual decisions, we used an
extensively studied odor categorization task that allowed us tosystematically vary the difficulty and hence confidence in a de-
cision (Uchida and Mainen, 2003; Kepecs et al., 2008). Upon en-
try into a central odor port, rats (N = 10) received an olfactory
stimulus (binary mixture of 2-octanol stereoisomers) and re-
sponded to the left or right choice ports based on the dominant
odor component (Figure 1A, see Experimental Procedures). Tri-
als with different odor-mixture ratios (20:80, 40:60, 44:56, and
50:50 mixtures and their conjugates, 80:20, etc.) were randomly
interleaved. Rats achieved high performance for easy stimuli
(larger mixture ratios), but were challenged by more difficult dis-
criminations (Figure 1B). The perceptual accuracy was stable
across several sessions of testing (Figure 1B). As previously re-
ported (Uchida and Mainen, 2003; Zariwala et al., 2013), reac-
tion times, as measured by the duration animals were sampling
the odor before moving to the choice port, showed little sensi-
tivity to odor-mixture ratio (Figure 1C; Figure S1 available
online).
An ideal confidence-reporting task requires a report of
choice and the confidence associated with that choice in the
same trial (Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Middlebrooks and Som-
mer, 2012). Lacking this, it is difficult to rule out alternative
mechanisms, a limitation of opt-out tasks (Smith et al., 2008;
Kepecs, 2013). In addition, a continuous, rather than dis-
crete, behavioral measure of confidence might enable strongerNeuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 191
A B
DC
Figure 2. A Computational Framework for
Estimating Waiting Time Based on Decision
Confidence
(A) The optimal waiting time can be estimated by
comparing the rate of reward expectation rðtÞ and
the opportunity cost, k. While waiting for a reward,
the agent faces this decision at each moment in
time. If the expected rate of reward falls below the
opportunity cost, the observer should abort the
trial and initiate a new trial. The rate of reward
expectation rðtÞ is the probability that a reward
will arrive at the next moment (denoted as event
R), given that the agent did not yet receive reward
(denoted as event W)
(B) The model predicts that WTopt monotonically
increases with the level of decision confidence, C.
(C) In each trial, the stimulus is defined as the
percentage of one of the components in the odor
mixture ðmÞ and the internal representation of the
stimulus ðm0 Þ is a noisy read-out of the external
stimulus.
(D) Choice in each trial is computed by
comparing the value of m0 and the decision
boundary (b = 50%), thus a step function of m0.
Decision confidence, is a function of the distance
between the internal representation of stimulus
m0 and the decision boundary, as defined by
Equation 7.
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Sher, 2008; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012). To allow rats to wager
on the likelihood that their decision was correct, we delayed
reward delivery and measured the time animals were willing
to wait at the choice ports (Figures 1A and 1D). Reward delay
was drawn from an exponential distribution (decay constant,
t = 1.5, see Experimental Procedures) to generate a relatively
constant level of reward expectancy over a range of delays
(i.e., flat hazard rate; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Zariwala
et al., 2013). Incorrect choices were not explicitly signaled
and hence rats eventually left the choice ports to initiate a
new trial. To measure waiting time (WT) for correct choices,
we introduced a small fraction of catch trials (10%–15%) for
which rewards were omitted. Therefore, in this novel postdeci-
sion wagering paradigm, each trial resulted in a binary choice
as well as a graded wager, WT, for all incorrect trials and a frac-
tion of correct trials.
Derivation of Optimal Confidence-Based Temporal
Wagering
To maximize reward, an ideal observer should wait until the rela-
tive expected value of waiting for reward drops below the ex-
pected value of leaving. Because reward size is constant from192 Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.trial-to-trial but depends on being correct,
the subjective expected value of staying
varies from trial-to-trial with the level
of decision confidence. To derive the
normative waiting time, we assumed
that the observer arrives at the reward
port with a specific internal expectation
about how likely it is to receive the reward,reflecting its decision confidence, which we denoted by the var-
iable C. Assume that the observer has spent time t in the port
without receiving a reward. The observer then faces the decision
whether to spend the next interval, from t to t +dt inside the
reward port or leave and initiate a new trial. This decision should
be based on the reward hazard function—the probability of get-
ting reward at the next moment given that no reward has been
received until now (Figure 2A). This probability can be computed
through Bayes’ theorem. Let us denote as Wt the event that
waiting until time t was not rewarded, and R the event that
reward arrives at the next moment, from t to t +dt. The reward
expectation (hazard) function can be expressed as the condi-
tional probability PðRjWtÞ:
PðRjWtÞ=PðWtjRÞPðRÞ
PðWtÞ : (Equation 1)
Notice that by definition the probability of waiting without
reward given that reward arrives in the next moment, PðWtjRÞ,
is 1. The probability of being rewarded at the next moment,
P(R), depends on the subject’s estimate of the time of reward
delivery. We denote the experimenter-defined temporal distri-
bution of reward during the anticipation period as PrewðtÞ, a dis-
tribution that was kept fixed during testing (see Figure 1D, blue
Neuron
Decision Confidence and Orbitofrontal Cortexcurve). Then the probability of getting rewarded at the next
moment is given by:
PðRÞ=Ptrial3PrewðtÞdt; (Equation 2)
where Ptrial is the expectation of being rewarded in the current
trial for the given choice. Because we are describing the
reasoning of the ideal observer, the expectation to be rewarded
should be based on the internal representation of response ac-
curacy, which means that Ptrial can be associated with the deci-
sion confidence, i.e., Ptrial =C. The probability of waiting until
time t without reward can be evaluated as 1 PðWtÞ, i.e., as
one minus the probability of being rewarded during that time
PðWtÞ= 1 C
Z t
0
Prewðt0Þdt0: (Equation 3)
From these equations, we can compute the probability of being
rewarded within time interval from t to t +dt under the condition
that the reward was not delivered before that
PðRjWtÞ
dt
hrðtÞ= C,PrewðtÞ
1 C
Z t
0
Prewðt0Þdt0
: (Equation 4)
Here rðtÞ is the rate of reward expected by the observer within
the next time interval, which is the reward expectation per unit
time. Since, in our experiments, PrewðtÞ= expðt=tÞ=t, we obtain
the reward hazard as a function of decision confidence
rðtÞ= 1
t
Cet=t
1 C+Cet=t: (Equation 5)
To obtain the optimal waiting time, the rate of reward expectation
rðtÞ should be compared to the average reward rate for the ses-
sion, k, representing the value of leaving or opportunity cost.
Indeed, if rðtÞ<k, i.e., when the expected rate of reward falls
below the opportunity cost, the observer should leave the port
and initiate a new trial (Figure 2A). The optimal waiting time,
WTopt, can therefore be obtained from the equation
rðWToptÞ= k, where rðtÞ is given by Equation 5, whereas k is a
parameter similar across trials. From this equation, the optimal
waiting time is a function of the decision confidence, C
(Figure S2):
WTopt = t ln

C
1 C
1 kt
kt

: (Equation 6)
Here C is decision confidence variable from trial to trial, whereas
k is the opportunity cost (a constant). Opportunity cost is ex-
pected to be smaller than 1=t, because otherwise the ideal
observer would not have an incentive to go to the reward port.
Thus, the product kt is less than one. This derivation reveals
that WTopt monotonically increases with confidence levels,
consistent with intuition (Figure 2B and Figure S2). The equation
predicts that when k>C=t, then WT is zero; meaning that in very
low confidence trials or when the opportunity cost is large, it is
not worth for the observer to wait inside the reward port. Thus
in these cases the animal should abort the trial as quickly as
possible.Tomodel decision confidence, we used a signal detection the-
ory framework where each choice and its associated confidence
could be estimated by comparing the sampled stimulus and the
decision boundary. We modeled the stimulus as the percentage
of one of the components in the odor mixture henceforth de-
noted by m and defined a noisy read-out of that as the internal
representation of the stimulus m0 (Figure 2C; see Experimental
Procedures). In each trial, the values of m0 exceeding the deci-
sion boundary (b = 50%) result in a response to the right,
whereas the valuesm0<50%produce a left response (Figure 2D).
The distance between the internal representation of stimulus m0
and boundary provides an estimate of decision confidence, C
(Figure 2D). Specifically, decision confidence in our approach
is defined as the probability of making the correct decision
C=Cðm0Þ (see Experimental Procedures). It is not difficult to
see that for a simple decision task described here, the probability
of being correct is
Cðm0Þ= 1
2

1+ erf

 jm
0  bj
s
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p

; (Equation 7)
where s is the SD of overall sensory and internal noise distribu-
tion. Thus confidence, C, is an internal metric about the prob-
ability of choice correctness. Because the internal representa-
tion of the stimulus m0 varies from trial to trial even if the
stimulus mixture m is fixed, response accuracy becomes
coupled with decision confidence. Because C=Cðm0Þ is an in-
ternal variable, it is not available for direct measurement but it
could be assessed through the time spent by the observer in
the reward port as described above (Equation 6). Notably, de-
cision confidence with similar properties could also be derived
from other decision frameworks based on Bayes’ rule, integra-
tion of evidence, and attractor models (Kepecs and Mainen,
2012).
Rats’ Behavior Is Consistent with the Normative
Temporal Wagering Model
We used this computational framework to examine whether rats’
WTs could be used as a trial-by-trial proxy of decision confi-
dence. To do so, we fitted our model to rats’ behavior (Figure 3).
Starting from the rat’s psychometric curve, we estimated the
overall choice uncertainty (SD of the overall sensory and internal
noise distribution, s, see Experimental Procedures for details of
fitting). We then used the estimated s to calculate the intermedi-
ate variable, decision confidence (C), for each trial (Figure 3A,
middle). We then fitted a single free parameter, the opportunity
cost, k, that minimized the difference between rat’s and the
model’s WT distribution (Figure 3A, right). Although this model
fit the mean WTs for each condition well, to fit to the full WT dis-
tribution we also assumed that rat’s estimation of elapsed time
carries uncertainty. Specifically, previous studies have shown
that the SD of time estimates scales with elapsed time; referred
to as ‘‘scalar timing’’ (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1997; Janssen
and Shadlen, 2005). Therefore, for the fitting, the model’s WT
distribution was blurred with a normal distribution whose SD
was proportional to the elapsed time (Figure 3A, right; see Exper-
imental Procedures). As expected from Equation 6, following this
fitting, the WTs showed a monotonic relationship with the esti-
mated confidence levels (Figure 2B), demonstrating that WTsNeuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 193
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A Figure 3. Postdecision Waiting Time Report
Follows Decision Confidence
(A) Fitting the computational model to the behav-
ioral data. Two parameters need to be estimated.
First, the SD of the sensory and internal noise
distribution (s), which was used to calculate
model’s trial by trial choice and confidence. Sec-
ond, the opportunity cost (k), which, alongside
confidence and reward delay distribution (Equa-
tion 6) was used to calculate model’s WT. (Left and
Middle) Estimating the model’s noise from rat’s
psychometric curve; swas estimated, which could
minimize the difference between rat’s and model’s
psychometric curves. The estimatedswas used to
estimate the confidence associated with a choice
in each trial. (Right) The opportunity cost, k, was
estimated by minimizing the difference between
the rat’s and the model’s WT distributions.
Following the fitting, the model’s WT distribution
closely overlapped rat’s WT distribution. See
Experimental Procedures for details of fitting.
(B–D) Predictions of themodel and behavioral data
from example rat. The model produces testable
predictions about the relationship between confi-
dence, perceptual accuracy, stimulus difficulty,
and trial outcome. The predictions of the model
closely match the behavioral data. In each image,
thick lines represent the predictions of the model
(with parameters optimized to fit rat’s accuracy
curve and overall WT distribution) and behavioral
data are shown as mean ± SEM across trials. (B)
The model predicts that decisions with longer WT
have higher accuracy (thick lines). Lines show
model’s psychometric curves separated based on
WT. Dark gray thick line represents long WT
(defined as above 70th percentile), light gray thick
line represents short WT (shorter than 70th
percentile). Dots show rat’s perceptual accuracy separated based on WT. Black dots represent long WT trials (defined as above 70th percentile) and gray dots
indicate short WT trials (shorter than 70th percentile). Logistic psychometric fits, used for the slope comparison, are not shown. (C) In the model, WT predicts
choice accuracy (thick line). Consistent with this prediction, rat’s decision accuracy increases with longer WT (thin line). (D) The model predicts that waiting time
varies with stimulus difficulty in opposing directions depending on choice correctness (thick lines; correct: green, error: red) and rat’s WTs are consistent with this
prediction. Dots show mean WT of the example rat as a function of odor mixture contrast and trial outcome (correct, green; error, red).
(E–G) As in (B)–(D) averaged across 10 rats (mean ± SEM across rats). In (E), black and gray lines represent logistic fit on the accuracy data in long and short WT
trials, respectively (see Experimental Procedures). In (G), lines represent linear fits on the rats’ WT data.
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confidence.
Thismodel yields specificpredictionsabouthowWT, asaproxy
for decision confidence, relates to other experimentally controlled
and monitored variables. First, decisions in trials with longer WT
are expected to have higher accuracy (Figure 3B, thick lines) for
any given stimulus difficulty. Consistent with this prediction,
when we separated behavioral trials into long and short WT,
choice accuracy in trials with intermediate odor mixture contrast
showed significant dependency on WT (Figures 3B and 3E, p <
0.05, Mann-Whitney U test across trials in 10/10 rats; and p <
0.05,Mann-WhitneyU test across rats). The slope of the rats’ psy-
chometric functionswas also steeper for longWT trials (p< 0.05 in
10/10 rats; and p < 0.001 across rats, bootstrap test, see Experi-
mental Procedures). Second, WT is expected to predict choice
accuracy (Figure 3C, thick line). Consistent with this prediction,
we found that animals’ WT-conditioned accuracy function (see
Experimental Procedures) monotonically increased with longer194 Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.WT, ranging from chance level to near-perfect performance (Fig-
ures 3C and 3F). Third, WT is expected to vary with stimulus diffi-
culty inoppositedirectionsdependingonchoicecorrectness (Fig-
ure 3D, thick lines). Indeed, we found that rats’ mean WTs varied
with stimulusdifficulty, and this relationshipwasopposing for cor-
rect and error trials (Figures 3D and 3G). For all these predictions,
themodelwith parameters optimized to fit the rats’ overallWTdis-
tributions (Figure 3A) showed a striking match to their behavioral
data, as can be seen in Figures 3B–3D. These properties further
established WT as a good trial-by-trial proxy of C and suggest
that it can serve as an implicit report of decision confidence.
We also examined the effects of trial history on the stability and
confidence-dependence ofWT.We found that themeanWTwas
stable from the beginning to the end of a session (Figures S3A
and S3B, p > 0.3, Mann-Whitney U test across trials in 10/10
rats; and p = 0.86, Mann-Whitney U test across rats). We
observed a small but systematic effect of the outcome of the
previous trial (correct/error) and the WT of the previous trial
A B C
E FD
Figure 4. OFC Inactivation Disrupts Confi-
dence-Dependent Waiting Time but Not
Decision Accuracy
(A)Schematic for cannulae implants andanatomical
locationsof confirmed inactivation sites across rats.
See Figure S4 for examples of histology sections.
(B) Decision accuracy as a function of odor mixture
contrast for control (saline and no injection com-
bined) andmuscimol conditions for the example rat
(top) and averaged across rats (bottom). Lines are
logistic fits to the data (see Experimental Pro-
cedures). In all images, error bars are ±SEM across
trials or across rats. Cannulae implantation itself
had no effect on the decision accuracy (Figure S6).
(C) Mean waiting times for control and muscimol
conditions for the example rat (top) and averaged
across rats (bottom).
(D) Psychometric functions separated based onWT
in the control and muscimol conditions for the
example rat (top) and averaged across rats (bot-
tom). Black andgray dots represent longWT (above
70th percentile) and short WT (shorter than 70th
percentile) control trials, respectively. Red and pink
dots represent long WT (above 70th percentile) and
short WT (shorter than 70th percentile) muscimol
trials, respectively. Lines represent logistic fit on the
accuracy data (see Experimental Procedures).
(E)MeannormalizedWTplottedasa functionofodor
mixture contrast and trial outcome for control and
averaged across rats (bottom). To combine WTs
acrossdifferent sessionsof each rat andacross rats,
normalized WTs were used. For this normalization,
the WT in each trial was divided by mean WT of all
trials of the session (see Experimental Procedures).
Lines are linear fit to the data. Asterisks indicate
significant differences (p < 0.05) between individual
data points. Cannulae implantation itself had no ef-
fect on the WT pattern (Figure S6). See Figure 6 for
effect of muscimol on WT patterns in rats with
cannulae positioned outside OFC.
(F) Decision accuracy as a function of z-scored
waiting time (see Experimental Procedures) for
control and muscimol conditions for the example
rat (top) and averaged across rats (bottom).
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Decision Confidence and Orbitofrontal Cortex(short/long) on absolute WT. Rats tended to wait longer for
reward following trials with correct outcome as well as after trials
with long WT. These effects did not reach significance when
averaging across rats (Figure S3A, p > 0.10, Mann-Whitney U
test across rats), but were significant in many individual rats (Fig-
ures S3C and S3D, p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney U test across trials in
7/10 rats for the effect of previous outcome, and 5/10 rats for the
effect of previous WT). These patterns of modulation would be
expected if the distribution of temporal reward expectancies,
Prew(t), was updated based on the reinforcement history. At the
same time, these effects did not lead to significant changes to
the C-dependence of WT (Figures S3E–S3P, p > 0.10, ANOVA
across rats, see Experimental Procedures).
Inactivation of Orbitofrontal Cortex Impairs Confidence-
Based Waiting Times but Not Choice Accuracy
Next, we pharmacologically inactivated OFC and examined de-
cision performance and C-dependent waiting times. Rats werefirst trained in the task described above. After reaching criterion
performance levels, we implanted dual cannulae bilaterally in
lateral and ventrolateral parts of OFC (Figures 4A and S4; see
Experimental Procedures). Following recovery, on alternate
testing days rats (n = 4) received intra-OFC infusion of either
the GABA-A agonist muscimol for silencing neural activity or a
saline solution or no injection. Because we found no differences
in accuracy, reaction time and WT between saline and no injec-
tion sessions (p > 0.10, Mann-Whitney U test across trials in four
of four rats; and p > 0.10 Mann-Whitney U test across rats), we
combined these as the control condition. We found that OFC
inactivation did not change sensory discrimination performance
(Figures 4B and S5A), odor sampling duration, or movement time
(Figures S5D–S5I), establishing that it is not required for percep-
tual decisions (accuracy: p > 0.10, bootstrap test on the slope of
the psychometric functions in four of four rats; and p > 0.60,
ANOVA across rats; reaction time: p > 0.10, ANOVA across trials
in two of four rats (p = 0.01 in other two rats); and p > 0.20,Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 195
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Figure 5. OFC Inactivation Reduces the Accuracy of Confidence
Report
(A) Probability distribution of normalized WTs for error and correct (reward
omission) trials in control and muscimol conditions shown for 60% odor
mixture contrast for the example rat.
(B) ROC curve computed from probability distributions in (A), as threshold, q,
varied. A rescaled value for the area under this ROC curve is used as the
confidence-reporting index (CRI) (see Experimental Procedures).
(C) CRI as a function of odor mixture contrast for control and muscimol
conditions for the example rat. Error bars are bootstrapped estimates.
(D) CRI as a function of odor mixture contrast for control and muscimol
conditions averaged across rats. Error bars are ±SEM across rats.
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average WT was not affected by OFC inactivation (Figures 4C
and S5C; p > 0.20, Mann-Whitney U test across trials in three
of four rats (p = 0.01 in the fourth rat); and p > 0.80, Mann-Whit-
ney U test across rats). However, while psychometric functions
of the short and long WT trials had significantly different slopes
in the control condition, this difference was negligible in the inac-
tivation condition (Figure 4D; p < 0.05 in four of four rats; and p <
0.01 across rats, bootstrap test on the slope differences). More-
over, we found that the dependence of WT on stimulus difficulty
and outcome was significantly reduced (Figure 4E; p < 0.01,
bootstrap test on the slope of the fitted lines in four of four
rats; and p < 0.01, ANOVA across rats, see Experimental Proce-
dures) without a concomitant change in the mean WT. In addi-
tion, accuracy as a function of WT flattened (Figure 4F; p <
0.05, Mann-Whitney U test for selected time bins across trials
in three of four rats; and p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U test for
selected time bins across rats), establishing that WT became a
worse predictor of performance.
The previous analyses only considered the mean WT patterns
and not their variance and distribution. Therefore we next evalu-
ated how well a subject’s waiting time report conformed to its196 Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.actual decision accuracy using type-II receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) analysis (Kepecs et al., 2008; Fleming et al.,
2010; Rounis et al., 2010; Figures 5A and 5B; see Experimental
Procedures). This confidence-reporting index (CRI) systemati-
cally varied as a function of stimulus difficulty (Figures 5C and
5D; p < 0.01, ANOVA across trials in four of four rats) as expected
and was significantly reduced by OFC inactivation (Figures 5C,
5D, and S5B; p < 0.01, ANOVA across trials in four of four rats;
and p < 0.05, ANOVA across rats).
Finally, we considered the specificity of these results to the
ventrolateral portion of OFC (vlOFC). Out of nine implanted
rats, we initially excluded five rats from our previous analyses
in which histological examination showed that some of the four
cannulae were positioned either too lateral to vlOFC or too
ventral reaching the piriform cortex (Figure S4). To quantify the
relationship between the position of cannulae and the behavioral
effects, we measured the position of the cannulae relative to the
centers of the vlOFC and the piriform cortex (see Experimental
Procedures for details). We then examined confidence reports
and perceptual accuracy as a function of the average distance
of cannulae relative to the OFC and piriform cortex (Figure 6A).
The perceptual accuracy of rats with cannulae close to the piri-
form cortex was attenuated by muscimol inactivation, suggest-
ing an important role for the piriform region in our odor-guided
decision task (Figure 6B; p < 0.05 in two of two rats, bootstrap
test on the slope differences). On the other hand, when cannulae
were positioned very laterally, outside vlOFC, we did not observe
any effects of inactivation on either perceptual accuracy or the
WT pattern (Figure 6C; p > 0.2 in three of three rats, bootstrap
test on the slope differences). These results specifically implicate
the vlOFC in confidence reporting.
DISCUSSION
Confidence judgments are usually studied using explicit self-re-
ports in humans and are taken at face value. To study nonhuman
animals, a different approach is required. We introduced a new
postdecision gambling task that makes confidence reports valu-
able for animals and allows experimenters to collect choices and
confidence reports from the same trials (Kepecs and Mainen,
2008; Middlebrooks and Sommer, 2012). This is an advantage
compared to opt-out tasks in which animals are presented
with a third choice that provides a guaranteed but smaller
reward. Opt-out choices may be made in epochs when the
attentional or motivational state of an animal is reduced, so
that if an animal is monitoring these state changes, it could prefer
to opt out of the perceptual decision. For these reasons, opt-out
designs are not ideal for studying decision confidence because
in these tasks each trial only provides either a perceptual or an
opt-out choice, making it difficult to rule out behavioral mecha-
nisms that do not require uncertainty monitoring. The time in-
vestment gambling task described here had fundamental simi-
larity to the restart task we previously used in which rats could
abort the current trial to restart a new trial (Kepecs et al.,
2008). However, the restart task provided only a binary measure
of decision confidence (i.e., stay or restart). Consequently,
another feature of current task design is that WTs served as
continuous wagers (instead of binary bets). This is preferable
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Figure 6. Observed Behavioral Effects Are Specific to Ventrolateral
OFC Inactivation
(A) Behavioral effects as a function of cannula location. (Left) Psychometric
slope ratios for each rat as a function of cannulae distance from the piriform
cortex (PC). (Right) CRI ratios for each rat as a function of cannula distance
from the vlOFC. Each dot indicates the average distancemeasured for each rat
(averaged across all visible cannulae tracks). Error bars are SEM across
measurements.
(B) Rats with cannulae both in the vlOFC and piriform cortex (n = 2). (Left)
Schematic of cannulae positions. (Middle) Rats’ psychometric functions.
(Right) Rats’ WT pattern. Asterisks indicate significant differences (p < 0.05)
between individual data points.
(C) The same as (B) for rats with cannulae out of the vlOFC (n = 3). Compare
behavioral effects shown in (B) and (C) with effects shown in Figures 4B and E.
Neuron
Decision Confidence and Orbitofrontal Cortextomitigate the problem of finding the optimal payoff matrix for bi-
nary bets that depends on animals’ internal costs and valuations
(Clifford et al., 2008; Schurger and Sher, 2008;Middlebrooks and
Sommer, 2011).
To establish thatWTs could serve as indices of confidence, we
compared rats’ WT patterns to a normative model of decision
confidence. First, we showed that the optimal time to wait de-
pends monotonically on the initial reward probability for each
trial (Figure 2). In perceptual decisions, reward probability can
be estimated based on the confidence associated with a deci-
sion. Second, we derived three predictions for decision confi-
dence and compared these to WTs. As expected for a proxy of
confidence, we found that WTs (1) correlated with the slope of
psychometric functions, (2) predicted decision accuracy, and(3) showed a characteristic dependence on signal-to-noise ratio
and outcome (Figure 3). This allowed us to interpret our findings
in the context of a normative model rather than a semantic
definition of confidence. From a computational standpoint, the
observed WTs could only be explained by models in which
the variable P(correctjevidence), i.e. confidence, is taken into
consideration. Rats’ WTs are determined not only by decision
confidence, but also by estimated reward delivery time and other
reinforcement-related factors (Figure S3). Nevertheless, the ac-
curate computation of such reward expectation is only possible
by incorporating confidence information.
Inactivation of the vlOFC disrupted the confidence-depen-
dence of WTs without a change in decision accuracy or mean
WT (Figures 4, 5, and 6). These results provide evidence that
an intact OFC is necessary for reporting confidence but not for
perceptual decision making under uncertainty. Beyond estab-
lishing an anatomical locus for confidence judgments, the results
also show that confidence reporting and the computation of
perceptual decisions are at least in part distinct processes local-
ized to different brain regions. From this perspective, our findings
reinforce recent observations regarding the role of pulvinar in the
representation of perceptual confidence (Komura et al., 2013).
Using an opt-out task, these authors showed that inactivation
of pulvinar increases monkeys’ opt-out choices in the wagering
task without affecting perceptual categorization. However, for
reasons discussed above, this experimental design could not
rule out alternative possibilities. For instance, pulvinar inactiva-
tion could cause either lower risk-taking propensity or reduced
attention, both leading to an increased opt-out behavior (Ke-
pecs, 2013).
Our findings leave open the question of whether OFC locally
computes confidence or instead receives confidence signals
from other areas (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Insabato et al.,
2010; Rolls et al., 2010a, 2010b; Komura et al., 2013) but we
consider it likely that choice and confidence are computed
together and represented in regions important for perceptual de-
cision making and then relayed to OFC. In this scenario, OFC
might act as a central region for monitoring confidence level,
alongside other reward-related variables, regardless of percep-
tual modality. Neuronal signals related to metacognitive moni-
toring have been observed in several subregions of the frontal
cortex (Lau and Passingham, 2006; Persaud et al., 2007; Kepecs
et al., 2008; Tsujimoto et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2010; Rolls
et al., 2010a, 2010b; Yokoyama et al., 2010; De Martino et al.,
2013; Middlebrooks and Sommer, 2012; So and Stuphorn,
2012), as well as in parietal cortex (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009)
and thalamic nuclei such as pulvinar (Komura et al., 2013), sug-
gesting that metacognitive representations may be widespread
in the brain. Our results suggest that OFC may integrate distinct
sources of information, and similar to its role in value-based de-
cisions, may provide outcome predictions based on confidence
monitoring processes.
Previous findings have implicated OFC in representing reward
expectations (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Wallis, 2007;
Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008) and in goal-directed behavior
across species (Wallis, 2007; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008;
Schoenbaum et al., 2009; Morrison and Salzman, 2011).
Because decision confidence is also critical for computing theNeuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 197
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results are consistent with a role for OFC in outcome valuation.
OFC lesions are also known to impair the devaluation of reward
outcomes, reversal learning, and increase impulsivity (Bechara
et al., 2000; Schoenbaum et al., 2002; Berlin et al., 2004; Wallis,
2007; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008; Rudebeck and Murray,
2008; Burke et al., 2009; Schoenbaum et al., 2009; Noonan
et al., 2010; Walton et al., 2010; Mar et al., 2011), all of
which reflect a compromise in the relative potency of explicitly
imagined outcomes, as opposed to routine habits, in driving
decisions (Balleine, 2011). These are consistent with our ob-
servations that OFC inactivation only affected WT wagering
behavior and not well-learned decisions. Inactivation of OFC
might have impaired general reward expectations and the moti-
vation to wait for the reward (Noonan et al., 2010; Mar et al.,
2011). However, WT after OFC inactivation was only reduced
for correct trials, and increased for incorrect trials (Figure 4),
suggesting that a disruption of reward expectation could not
by itself account for the data. The fact that OFC inactivation
did not affect the mean WT suggests that the animals’ ability
to estimate the elapsed time remained intact. Moreover, rats’
movement times were not different between the muscimol
and control sessions (Figure S5) and were not different when
comparing pre- and postcannulae implantation (Figure S6),
implying that the observed behavioral patterns could neither
be attributed to the inactivation nor to the lesion of motor-
related structures along the cannulae walls. The observation
that following OFC inactivation rats failed to adjust their WT
based on the decision is consistent with the broader notion
that an intact OFC is necessary for some aspects of reward-
maximizing choice behavior (Wallis, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa,
2011). Confidence is also a form of uncertainty; therefore, our
results are broadly consistent with observations demonstrating
that OFC is involved in representing uncertainty and risk in hu-
mans (Critchley et al., 2001; Hsu et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2007;
Fleming et al., 2010; Rolls et al., 2010a; De Martino et al., 2013),
monkeys (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010), and rats (Kepecs et al.,
2008; Roitman and Roitman, 2010).
In summary, our results support the view that OFC is particu-
larly important for reward-based behaviors when values are in-
ferred, for instance using model-based reinforcement learning
algorithms (Daw and Doya, 2006; Hampton et al., 2006; McDan-
nald et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2014), rather
than when values are stored based on previous experiences.
This is because, the estimation of decision confidence is an
example of the computation of an inferred value based on a hid-
den belief state. Consequently, the role of OFC in confidence
monitoring can be viewed as a second-order and metacognitive
process that fits into the broader conception that OFC is critical
for making on-the-fly predictions about behaviorally important
outcomes.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Ten male Long-Evans rats were used for the experiments. Data from all rats
were used for the quantification of confidence reporting behavior. Nine rats un-
derwent the cannulae implantation surgery and based on anatomical localiza-198 Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.tions of implanted cannulae (Figures 6 and S4), data collected from four rats
were used for investigating the effect of OFC inactivation on the confidence re-
porting behavior.
Rats were motivated by water restriction and had unlimited access to food.
All procedures involving animals were carried out in accordance with NIH stan-
dards and were approved by the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committee.
Behavior
Behavioral Task and Training
The apparatus has been described previously (Uchida and Mainen, 2003;
Kepecs et al., 2008). Rats self-initiated each experimental trial by introducing
their snout into the central port where odor was delivered. After a variable
delay, drawn from a uniform random distribution of 0.2–0.5 s, a binary
mixture of two pure odorants, S(+)-2-octanol and R()-2-octanol, was deliv-
ered at one of seven concentration ratios (80:20, 60:40, 56:44, 50:50, 44:56,
40:60, 20:80 creating odor mixture contrast of 0%, 12%, 20%, and 60%) in
pseudorandom order within a session. After a variable odor sampling time
up to 0.7 s, rats responded by withdrawing from the central port, which
terminated the delivery of odor and moved to the left or right choice port.
Choices were rewarded according to the dominant component of the
mixture, that is, at the left port for mixtures A/B > 50/50 and at the right
port for A/B < 50/50. For trials with 50/50 odor mixture, the reward was
randomly assigned to one of the choice ports. A variable reward delay
period after entry into the choice port was introduced. For correct choices,
reward was delivered between at least 0.5 s after entry into the choice port
and up to 8 s. The reward delay was drawn from an exponential distribution
with decay constant equal to 1.5 (Figure 1D) resulting in a relatively constant
level of reward expectancy over a range of delays (i.e., flat hazard rate). In a
small fraction of correct choice trials distributed pseudorandomly throughout
the behavioral session (10%–15% of correct trials), rewards were omitted.
These reward omission trials were distributed to never occur on the consec-
utive trials. Because the rat spends time consuming the water in the re-
warded correct trials, we used the reward omission trials to measure WT
in the correct trials.
To perform the task described above, rats went through a multistep training
procedure typically lasting 6–8 weeks starting with imperative trials, moving to
choice trials and gradually introducing choice trials with low odor mixture
contrast.
Surgery and Inactivation Procedures
Surgery
All surgical procedures were carried out under aseptic conditions. Anesthesia
was initiated with inhalation of 2.5% isoflurane (Vetland) and retained with
intraperitoneal injections of ketamine (50 mg/kg) and medetomidine (0.4 mg/
kg), After craniotomy, dual guide cannulae (26-gauge Plastics One) were ster-
eotactically implanted in each hemisphere targeted 1.5 mm above OFC
(AP+3.2,ML±3.2, DV+2.8 from dura and AP+4.1, ML±2.8, DV+1.8 from
dura). Dual stainless steel stylets were inserted into the guide cannulae to
ensure patency (protruding 0.5 mm below the tip of the guide cannulae).
Pharmacological Inactivation
Temporary inactivation was achieved via localized injections of g-aminobuty-
ric acid (GABAA) receptor agonist muscimol (Sigma Aldrich) under light anes-
thesia induced by 2% isoflurane (for about 6 min during which hindleg reflex
never disappeared over the course of infusion). On each testing day, the stylets
were replaced with dual injector cannulae (33-gauge, Plastics One) protruding
1.5 mm below the tip of guide cannulae. One minute after proper placement of
the injectors, muscimol (0.05 mg in 0.4 ml) or sterile saline (0.9%; 0.4 ml) was
injected over a 5 min period. Fluid was infused via 0.38 mm diameter polyeth-
ylene tubing (Intramedic) attached to the injector on one end and to a 2 ml Ham-
ilton syringe (Hamilton) on the other end. The syringe was driven with a syringe
pump (Harvard Apparatus).
Injections were monitored by observing the movement of a small air bubble
in the tubing to confirm that fluid was moving. After infusions were complete,
the injector cannulae were left in place for 2 min and then replaced with stylets
to maintain cannulae patency. Behavioral testing began about 30 min after
infusion. It has been shown that the maximal extent of muscimol spread, using
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1999).
Histology
Once experiments were complete, rats were deeply anesthetized and then
transcardially perfused with 4% paraformaldehyde. Brains were removed,
postfixed, and coronal sections of 50 mmweremade using a fixed-tissue vibra-
tome (VT1000S, Leica Instruments). Only animals in which at least three of the
four cannulae were located within the lateral and ventrolateral portions of OFC
were included in our analysis. We determined that four of nine implanted ani-
mals had correct cannulae positions while the others extended either ventrally
into the piriform cortex or caudally into the striatum (Figures 6 and S4).
Computational Model
Confidence Estimation Model
To predict the expected patterns of decision confidence, we used a simple
model for two-alternative decisions. We used a signal detection theory frame-
work where each choice and its associated confidence could be estimated by
comparing the sampled stimulus and the decision boundary. The boundary
was fixed at 50%. In this framework, the choice in each trial is computed by
comparing stimulus and boundary. We modeled the stimulus as the percent-
age of one of the components in the mixture henceforth denoted bym. The in-
ternal representation of the stimulus m0 is different from the actual value m:
m0 =m+ x: (Equation 8)
Here x is the Gaussian variable with zero mean and the SD of s:
pðxÞ= ex2=2s3=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ps2
p
. The origin of noise x is 2-fold: it may be contributed
by the external uncertainties in the stimulus as well as the internal sources of
error. From fits to experimental data, we obtained an estimate of sz18%;
i.e., internal and external sources of noise in their strength are equivalent to
approximately 18% of the fraction of one components in the mixture. In
each trial, it is assumed that the value of the internal representation of the stim-
ulus determines the response of the observer. The values ofm0 exceeding the
decision boundary b = 50% result in response to the right, while the values
m0<50% produce a left response. For a given external stimulusm, the fraction
of right responses i.e., the psychometric function is given by
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In each trial, the distance between the internal representation of stimulus m0
and boundary provides an estimate of decision confidence, C. Decision con-
fidence in our approach is defined as the probability of making the correct de-
cision C=Cðm0Þ. Decision confidence, however, is a function of the internal
representation of the stimulus m0, which is different from the external value
(Equation 8). It is not difficult to see that for a simple decision task, the proba-
bility of being correct could be estimated using Equation 7.
It is important that, in each individual trial, the same internal representation of
the stimulus m0 that determines response (response to the right occurs when
m0R50%) is used to evaluate the decision confidence through Equation 7. The
internal representation of the stimulus m0 varies from trial to trial even if the
stimulus mixture m is fixed. Response accuracy therefore becomes coupled
with decision confidence. Because C=Cðm0Þ is an internal variable, it is not
available for direct measurement. Instead, it could be assessed through the
time spent by the observer in the reward port. In the computational model,
we used Equation 6 describing an ideal observer. Note that Equation 6 pre-
dicts that there are only two conditions when WT goes to infinity (i.e., waiting
never terminates): when the opportunity cost, k, is zero (waiting has no cost) or
when a rat is completely confident about its choice C = 1. However, there is
always some reward to be gained in future trials and because of reward omis-
sion trials, a rat cannot be completely certain of reward; hence, WT is always
finite.
Fitting the Model to Behavioral Data
To fit our model to rats’ behavioral data, we estimated two parameters. First,
the width of the total noisy distribution (s, made up of sensory and internal
noise) used to calculate model’s trial by trial choice and confidence. Second,
opportunity cost (k) which, alongside confidence and reward delay distribution
(Equation 6) is used to calculate model’s WT. Parameter estimation was done
using a maximum likelihood method, implemented using MATLAB’s fmin-search function. To avoid local minima,we re-ran fminsearch 1,000 times using
random starting parameter values and selected the set of parameter estimates
with the smallest mean squared error.
Starting from rat’s psychometric curve, we estimated one parameter (s) that
minimized the mean squared error of choice predictions. We then used the
estimated s to calculate the intermediate variable, decision confidence (C),
in each trial (Figure 3A, middle) and subsequently estimated one other param-
eter, k (Equation 6), which could minimize the difference between rat’s and the
model’s WT distribution (Figure 3A, right). Although this model fit the mean
WTs per condition well, to fit to the entire WT distribution we also assumed
‘‘scalar timing.’’ In other words, we assumed that a rat’s estimation of elapsed
time carries uncertainty and in particular that the SD scales with elapsed time
(Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1997; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005). This implies
that a time t is perceived at time t ± s(t), where
sðtÞ=f,t; (Equation 10)
where f is the coefficient of variation or Weber fraction (Gibbon, 1977).
Consistent with previous findings, we set f= 0:3 (Gibbon et al., 1997; Jans-
sen and Shadlen, 2005). Therefore, for the fitting, the model’s WT distribution
was blurred with a normal distribution whose SD was proportional to the
elapsed time (Figure 3A, right). Lines in Figures 3B–3D show predictions of
the model with parameters optimized to fit rat’s accuracy curve and WT
distribution.
Analysis of Behavioral Data
We collected 68,243 trials from ten rats as following: 24,032 control trials (sa-
line injection or no injection) and 11,106 muscimol trials from four rats (79 ses-
sions, in average 445 trials per session per rat, minimum trial per session = 295,
maximum trial per session = 654,minimum session per rat = 15,maximumses-
sion per rat = 29). These data were included in analysis of confidence-related
WTs as well as the muscimol experiment; 23,473 control trials and 9,632 mus-
cimol trials from six rats (five of them implanted, 81 sessions, in average 408
trials per session per rat, minimum trial per session = 281, maximum trial per
session = 701, minimum session per rat = 12, maximum session per rat =
18). Due to incorrect position of cannulae revealed by histological examination
(Figure S4), these data were only used in the analysis of confidence-related
WTs and in Figure 6.
In general, we used nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test for single compar-
isons and one or two-way ANOVA, post-hoc test adjusted, for multiple com-
parisons. Bootstrap test used for the comparing fit parameters in Figures 3E
and 4B–4E) and for comparisons shown in Figures 5C and S5B. For statistical
analysis across rats, averaged data for each rat was used. However, the large
number of trials collected for each rat also enabled us to examine the signifi-
cance of behavioral effects for each subject separately. For such analyses
on single rats, statistical tests were performed across all trials collected for
each animal. Asterisks in figures illustrate statistically significant (p < 0.05) dif-
ferences for individual data points using Mann-Whitney U test (bootstrap test
was used for Figure 5C). Filled/empty markers in scatter plots indicate signif-
icant/nonsignificant differences tested using Mann-Whitney U test (bootstrap
test was used for Figure S5B). Unless stated otherwise, error bars in figures
indicate SEM across trials for individual animals or across rats for the popula-
tion data.
Perceptual Accuracy and Reaction Time Data
For illustration proposes only, we fit behavioral choice data (probability of
choosing left port) as a function of odor concentration (%A) to a logistic func-
tion of the following form (Figure 1B):
Accuracy =
1
1+ eða+ b3Odor mixtureÞ
; (Equation 11)
where a is a measure of choice bias and b reflects perceptual sensitivity.
We fit behavioral accuracy data as a function of odor mixture contrast to a
logistic function of the following form (Figures 3E, 4B, and 4D):
Accuracy =
1
1+eðb3Odor ContrastÞ
; (Equation 12)
where b reflects perceptual sensitivity (i.e., psychometric slope), with higher
values implying increased sensitivity.Neuron 84, 190–201, October 1, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 199
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WT data exhibited small variation across sessions and subjects. Therefore,
for each rat the WTs of each session were normalized to the mean of the
WT of that session (normalized WT). Other possible ways to normalize the
data (normalization to the median WT of the session or normalization to
the mean/median of the WT for odor mixture contrast = 0) resulted in very
similar findings. For illustration proposes, nonnormalized WT data were used
in Figure 3.
For Figure 4F, z-scored WT (Equation 13) was used to compute the condi-
tioned accuracy graphs (see below). However, using normalized WT (instead
of z-scored waiting time) showed comparable results.
ZscoredWTtrial =
WTtrial  mðWTsessionÞ
sðWTsessionÞ (Equation 13)
We fit WT data as a function of odor mixture contrast and trial outcome to a
linear function of the following form (Figures 3G and 4E):
NormalizedWT =a+ ð± b3Odor contrastÞ; (Equation 14)
where b indicates the slope of change in the normalizedWT as a function of the
odor mixture contrast and its sign (/+) indicates error/correct outcomes,
respectively.
WT-Conditioned Accuracy Measures
To estimate rats’ decision accuracy as a function of WT, we assumed thatWTs
for correctly performed reward omission trials (which were pseudorandomly
distributed) were a good representative for the distribution of all correctly per-
formed trials. Therefore, the z-scored WT data (Equation 13) were expanded
to all correct trials (taking into account the odor stimulus identity) and WT-
conditioned accuracy functions were computed (Figure 4F). For illustration
purposes unnormalized WT data was used for the similar analysis shown in
Figures 3C and 3F.
Confidence-Reporting Index
An objective measure of confidence reporting ability can be computed based
on the type II ROC curve, which quantifies how well a subject’s confidence
report conforms to its actual decision accuracy. For each animal for each of
the experimental conditions (muscimol versus control) the probability distribu-
tion of the normalized WT for the error trials and correct trials were first
computed (Figure 5A). The ROC was then generated for each of the experi-
mental conditions (Figure 5B), which indicates P (WT > q j correct) as a function
of P (WT > q j error), where q refers to the threshold that was varied to construct
the ROC curve. The CRI is the rescaled measure of the area under the ROC
curve, so that values close to zero indicate poor confidence and values close
to 1 indicate perfect decision confidence (Figures 5C, 5D, 6A, S3N–S3P,
and S5B).
Effects of Trial History on Waiting Time and Confidence Reporting
Measures
Apart from decision confidence, the waiting time at the choice ports also de-
pends on when an animal is expecting the reward delivery. We were inter-
ested to determine the extent to which WT pattern and CRI, our measures
of confidence report, were affected by trial history. Figures S3E–S3G show
an example rat in which none of the mentioned parameters affected its
mean WT. Consequently, the WT patterns are overlapping. Figures S3H–
S3J show an example rat in which outcome as well as WT of previous trial
affected its absolute WT. As a result, whereas WT patterns show a general
shift, the confidence-dependent WT patterns are robust. When averaging
across rats, WT as a function of odor mixture contrast and outcome did
not vary between the beginning and end of a session, after correct and error
trials or after long and short WTs (Figures S3K–S3M; p > 0.10, ANOVA
across rats). Similarly, CRI as a function of odor mixture contrast did not
vary between the beginning and end of a session, after correct and error tri-
als, or after long and short WTs (Figures S3N–S3P; p > 0.20, ANOVA across
rats).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes six figures and can be found with this
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